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Summary
Transition economies in Central Asian countries
and elsewhere face unique challenges of carrying
out synchronized reforms in most of the sectors
simultaneously. A study of such reform efforts
provides useful insights and lessons for many
other similar countries. This report analyzes the
evolving water-management institutions and their
performance of five core water management
functions, in the context of the ongoing economic
and agrarian reform in the Kyrgyz Republic.
These core water-management functions are,
operation of water systems, maintenance, re-
source mobilization, conflict resolution and organi-
zational management. Besides, the separation of
the institutional powers of the four basic roles of
regulation, governance, management (or imple-
mentation) and arbitration has also been studied.
The separation of these functions supports clear
relations of accountability and avoids conflicts of
interest, which may occur if some of these
powers are vested in the same organization. The
report also identifies key issues and challenges
that constrain effective stakeholder participation in
water-resources management.
While the Agrarian reform in the Kyrgyz
Republic has been rapid and comprehensive, the
markets are however, weakly developed, and
constraints on the availability of cash have led to
the operation of a vast barter system, involving
both the private and the government sectors. The
restructuring has caused an increasing inequity of
land distribution and has created an institutional
vacuum for the secondary canal-level water
distribution system. The capacity of water users
to jointly operate and maintain their irrigation
system, especially at the secondary canal level is
only slowly emerging. The management of water
resources for agriculture was structured along
administrative territorial boundaries of states,
provinces, districts and local management units,
crosscutting and fragmenting the river and canal
systems. The consequences of such a setup
were competition for, and conflict over, relatively
scarce water resources. This occurred particularly
during the peak demand period, not only between
water users but also between water management
units operating within the same hydro-system,
and led to widespread inequity between the head
and tail reaches of all levels of the irrigation
system, from the river basin through the main,
inter-farm canals (IFCs) and on-farm canals
(OFCs). The head sections of OFCs and IFCs
generally succeeded in appropriating water
resources beyond their entitlements, by using
various means. Within canal sections, cultivators
and farm units also negotiated for additional
supplies or out-of-turn irrigation releases with
considerable success. All such interventions
disorganized the operational regime and the tail
enders suffered water and income losses.
Conflict resolution was generally informal and
frequently involved the imposition of top-down
resolutions by higher authorities, and formal,
participatory and transparent conflict resolution,
involving local stakeholders, appeared to be
absent. Institutionalized debate and negotiations
were also found missing.
The obsolescence of the present allocation
system, based on demand aggregation and limit
setting, was among the chief causes of competi-
tion for water resources. A demand-based system
becomes dysfunctional under conditions of water
scarcity and turns into an opaque supply system.
The adherence to limits had become questionable
at the interstate level, limits no longer functioned
as an operational parameter at lower levels in the
sample sites studied and demand could not be
generally satisfied. As the head reaches tookvi
more water, inequity ensued and scarcity intensi-
fied downstream throughout the irrigation systems.
The emergence of an increasing number of
agricultural units complicated water management,
as it tended to multiply the quantity of individual
demands and thus made the design, timing and
observance of water distribution plans difficult.
The financial constraints led to suboptimal mainte-
nance and rehabilitation of canals and caused
considerable losses of water resources, which
caused suboptimal operating conditions, and
contributed to inequity and the undersupply of tail
reaches of the canal systems. The requisite
financial resources far exceeded the capacities of
the water users and the Government of the
Kyrgyz Republic.
The frequently delayed and partially in-kind
payment of irrigation service fee (ISF) and budget
allocations imposed significant constraints on the
ability of water managers to discharge their tasks
efficiently, in addition to their financial hardships.
The rate of ISF collection varied greatly, and the
levels of ISF failed to cover the actual operation
and maintenance (O&M) costs of Water User
Associations (WUAs), particularly if they applied
volumetric rates and were affected by inequity.
The ISF was levied on a volumetric basis, but
water measurement infrastructure was inad-
equate, especially along the secondary and
tertiary canals. The dominance of the barter
system and the weakness and inefficiency of
markets prevented cultivators from realizing the
value of their production in monetary terms.
Effective organizational management was
constrained by an outdated command-oriented
management model and organizational culture.
The accountability was only upwards and the staff
was organized in strict organizational and depart-
mental hierarchies. Insufficient team orientation
and the tendency toward administrative formality
prevented critical internal debate and open
exploration of problems and solutions. Conse-
quently, the organizations’ capacity for innovation,
problem-solving and staff motivation were con-
strained. Formal opportunities for stakeholder
participation, especially of water users, in the
governance process and debates within the Water
Management Organizations (WMOs) were absent.
Governance and executive functions were vested
in the same leading WUA officers. Thus, the
quality of management and service delivery
depended very much on the personality and level
of initiative of these organizational leaders. The
need for formal structures and an institutional
culture that facilitate high-performing management
organizations, were not widely perceived among
stakeholders.
Generally, the approach to WUA development
tended to remain within the entrenched model of
government services and did not sufficiently embed
the WUAs in the communities they served. WUA
mobilization was mainly carried out by the staff of
WMOs and local government agencies. A coherent
and well-designed participatory approach to social
mobilization, which targeted and involved both
water users and managers and built their capacity
for carrying out the core functions of water-
resources management did not exist. Participatory
structures and values were underrepresented and
the WUAs became a mere mechanism for the
transfer of system rehabilitation funding and labor
mobilization to water users. The need for profes-
sional social mobilization in the water-resources
sector had not been recognized. A legal framework
was under development in the Republic but it had
not been debated thoroughly with all stakeholders.
The granting of institutional powers to WUAs had
only been observed recently. Institutional mecha-
nisms for conflict resolution and the establishment
of WUAs on the basis of hydrological boundaries
were not considered in the proposed legal frame-
work.
The growing barter exchange due to underde-
veloped markets constraining the capacity of the
WMOs and WUAs to finance all the core func-
tions needs to be curtailed immediately through
rationalized fiscal and monetary policies. The
water resources managed along territorial bound-vii
aries of provinces, districts and Soviet-time farms
need to be reorganized, at all levels, along
hydrological boundaries following the principles of
integrated water resources management, where
the four roles of regulation, management, gover-
nance and dispute resolution are clearly sepa-
rated, stakeholders’ interests are strategically
brought in through the governance representative
structures, which should also be both formally
charged with the responsibilities of dispute resolu-
tion at their own level and responsible for unre-
solved disputes from the lower levels. The demo-
cratic governance structures at all levels need to
be introduced, through professional social mobili-
zation rather than through the existing top-down,
and bureaucratic governmental apparatus. The
key elements of mobilization should be aware-
ness-creation, consultation, information-sharing
and capacity-building of the stakeholders and their
governance structures at all levels. Such an
approach would lead to greater ownership of the
WUAs and WMOs by the stakeholders, and to
ensuring willingness to pay for O&M.
Under the growing water-scarcity conditions,
an increasing number of poor and small farmers,
increasing crop diversification, incompatible water-
delivery infrastructure and lack of water measure-
ment devices to measure water for each farmer,
the current demand-based water management
might not be relevant to the current needs, and
therefore, a proportionate supply-based system
might need to be adopted, like that in some
South Asian countries.
The ISF structures and levels need to be
rationalized. The low levels and inappropriate
structures of the ISF, coupled with the poor
capacity of the farmers to pay and weak markets,
necessitate exploring the potential of unconven-
tional means to finance the O&M and rehabilita-
tion needs of the irrigation and drainage infra-
structure. Such unconventional means could
include, for example, growing and selling fruit and
other fast-growing timber on the canal banks,
selling the nutrient-rich silt for earth-filling or
improving farm fertility, or selling out fishing rights.
The current and forthcoming rehabilitation
efforts through development projects, which
partially subsidize rehabilitation, should be imple-
mented in such a way that encourages invest-
ments by the stakeholders in the infrastructure,
rather than creating a dependency on external
sources. Such an approach will lead to greater
ownership of infrastructure and management
organizations by the local stakeholders.1
The Kyrgyz Republic, like other Central Asian
countries, is in transition toward a market
economy. With the transition from administratively
centralized and river-basin-oriented water-
resources management in the Soviet Union to
management by five independent Central Asian
republics, the vast and complex irrigation system
of the region has become fragmented. The
management of water is now organized along
administrative boundaries of provinces and
districts, ignoring hydrological principles. In
addition, the Kyrgyz economy is undergoing
agrarian reforms of property relations in the
agriculture sector. The former Sovkhozes and
Kolkhozes (FSKs), the state and collective farms,
respectively, are being transferred to private
ownership and/or lease rights.
1 This causes the
fragmentation of the former on-farm water-
management system into many smaller units and
poses the problem of reallocating management
authority at this level. All these circumstances
entail serious management challenges, which are
currently causing suboptimal O&M of irrigation
systems at best and conflict over water
resources, at worst.
Moreover, considerable seasonal variation of
water availability, insufficient financial resources
for WMOs, inadequate system maintenance, poor
irrigation practices and unreliable water supply
characterize irrigation systems in the Kyrgyz
Republic, as is the case in the rest of Central
Asia. These conditions have resulted in
increasingly inequitable water distribution, which
exacerbates the potential for conflict, excessive
water use by some, significant water losses and,
consequently, high volumes of drainage. Under
given geological conditions, drainage water is
recycled into downstream subsystems as
increasingly saline runoff, which threatens the
ecological sustainability of irrigated agriculture.
This report describes the results of an
institutional assessment of water management
institutions and water user associations (WUAs)
in the southern Kyrgyz Republic in the context of
the ongoing agrarian and water reforms. The
analysis was carried out in the Fergana Valley
under a broader assignment for the project
entitled, “Integrated Water Resources
Management in the Fergana Valley.”
2
The goal of this analysis is to provide an
insight into the inadequacies of the reform, which
have continued to, and will continue to, constrain
effective water management in the country. This
report proceeds with a methodological section,
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Introduction
1While the state farms were owned and managed by the government for research and production purposes, the collective farms were owned
collectively by the members of the farms and management was appointed by the state for producing the state-determined crops and production
levels.
2This was funded by the Swiss Agency for International Development Cooperation.2
Conceptual Framework
This conceptual framework outlines the key
concepts underlying the study. The study draws
on accepted principles and a common body of
knowledge, which have accumulated through
institutional research on irrigation management in
recent decades and applies them to specific
issues in Kyrgyzstan that were identified during
fieldwork for this study.
Core functions of WMOs
The study investigates five core functions of
WMOs that must be implemented in any
institutional arrangement for water-sector
management organizations. While there are
slight variations in the conceptualization of these
key functions in the literature (Brewer et al.
1999; Vermillion and Sagardoy 1999; AHT and
WAPDA 2001; Bandaragoda and Memon 1997;
Starkloff and Zaman 1999), five fundamental
areas of activity are recognized by most of
them: operations, maintenance, resource
mobilization, conflict resolution and
organizational management.
Institutional powers
Besides water-management functions assigned to
WMOs and related organizations, there are four
basic roles exercised by irrigation organizations.
These are commonly in need of being separated
organizationally or exercised by different units
within an organization. These are regulation,
governance, management (or implementation)
and arbitration. The separation of these functions
supports clear relations of accountability and
avoids conflicts of interest, which may occur if
some of these powers are vested in the same
organization.
IWRM and participatory irrigation management
(PIM)
IWRM is defined as “a process [or concept]
which promotes the coordinated development
and management of water, land, and related
resources, in order to maximize the resultant
economic and social welfare in an equitable
manner without compromising the sustainability
of vital ecosystems” (GWP 2000). This definition
considers water as everyone’s business, the
management of which cannot be effectively
achieved without real participation of all
stakeholders at their respective levels and
beyond.
Participation of the users of public services in
the management of these services has been a
longstanding concern among development
officers and irrigation professionals. In the water-
resources and irrigation sector, this has spawned
extensive debate, experimentation and reform
worldwide. A considerable body of literature and
which provides the underlying parameters of
analysis. The section then outlines the
research procedure and methods employed by
the study team. Section 3 presents an
overview of the key features of the post-Soviet
reforms in the Republic. Section 4 describes
the results of the case study in two irrigation
systems, as well as the vision of the respondents
about the future regarding reforms. The
concluding section identifies constraints to
effective IWRM in the Republic and makes some
recommendations.
Methodology3
common concepts has emerged. There are a
number of key terms, which go along with the
concept of participation and PIM. They describe
some of the essential ingredients of participation,
i.e., empowerment, accountability, transparency
and equity.
If farmers of different farm types and the
keepers of backyard gardens are expected to take
on new responsibilities in irrigation-service
provision, such as ownership of infrastructure,
management of O&M and payment of ISF, they
will also require incentives, which will justify the
increased transaction costs of irrigation services.
Participation and empowerment provide such
incentives by which farmers will be able to actively
contribute to ensuring that improved irrigation
services can lead to improved agricultural
productivity and higher incomes. Farmer-managed
irrigation systems are globally recognized for their
cost-effectiveness and often perform better than
government-managed systems (World Bank 1994;
Merrey 1996; Tang 1992; Benjamin et al. 1994;
FAO 1982; Yoder 1994).
Participation. Participation will provide farmers
with access to institutional representation from
which they may have been excluded previously.
It may mean that farmers will have increased
rights and influence over irrigation-system
management. Rights also convey responsibilities,
such as rule-bound behavior and competent
execution of tasks. However, participation is not
only about the participation of farmers or water
users. A genuinely participatory approach to
water-resources management ensures the
participation of all relevant stakeholders, including
water-management professionals, nonagricultural
water users and political representatives.
Participation confers appropriate levels of rights
and responsibilities on these actors and builds
their capacity to participate accordingly. The
meaning of what constitutes “appropriate levels
of rights and responsibilities” for all stakeholders
is subject to debate, and agreement among
these stakeholders would be their first task in the
development of participatory water-resources
institutions. The meaning of participation can be
further clarified by distinguishing several levels of
participation.
• Debates and decisions. There are debates
and decisions about the design of reformed
irrigation institutions from the start of the
reform process and subsequently as a
routine feature of management at all system
levels. This creates ownership and
motivation, because stakeholders’ needs,
interests and concerns are considered.
• Social mobilization, change and capacity
building. Without mobilizing all stakeholders
and promoting change and capacity among
them, some may lack understanding while
others may resist. Stakeholders’ active
involvement through education and
experimentation is required, so that they can
shape the process of change.
• Governance of WMOs. The key mechanism
for empowering stakeholders is entrusting
governance to water users or participatory
arrangements for stakeholder representation
or both. It involves ongoing discussions and
decision making about systems management
while keeping in view the requirements of all
stakeholders.
• Resource mobilization. Mobilizing and
controlling financial and other resources,
which make the management of irrigation
systems viable in the long run, are a primary
concern and also a mechanism for holding
users and managers accountable. ISF,
water-user labor contributions in
maintenance and joint investment in repairs
and rehabilitation are vital contributions
toward sustainable management.
• O&M of irrigation and water-supply systems.
Adequate and equitable O&M are the goals
of PIM. Particularly in large systems, O&M
would be carried out by salaried4
professionals, supervised and governed by
water users and other stakeholders.
• Organizational management. Competent day-
to-day implementation of responsibilities by
WMO officers and other staff crucially
contributes to the sustainability of PIM as
well.
• Regulation, monitoring and evaluation M&E.
Participatory M&E take the perceptions and
experiences of all stakeholders into
consideration and provide feedback to
stakeholders, service providers and
regulators about the quality and
effectiveness of services.
Empowerment. Participation in the ways just
described implies the empowerment of
stakeholders, such as farmers, who have thus far
lacked some of the rights and responsibilities
indicated; it also implies that others, who may
already have such rights, will share them.
Empowerment means an increase of the power
which a group or an actor can exert. Power is
about the relationships between people and thus
the degree of autonomy and dependence in
these relationships (Giddens 1979).
Empowerment of farmers means increased
access to institutional powers, including the
governance of management organizations in the
water sector.
Stakeholders’ relations of power must be
designed in such a way as not to hinder a
WMO’s capacity to discharge the responsibilities
assigned to it through PIM. In other words, the
powers assumed by farmers and their partners,
and the degree of autonomy of their
organizations should match their responsibilities.
Without changes in their power relations, “joint
management as currently practiced is often
business as usual with only cosmetic changes”
(Merrey 1996, 2).
Accountability. Accountability is a pivotal issue,
and institutions must be structured, in
combination with the tasks assigned, so that
government officials, irrigation personnel and
farmers achieve mutual accountability for law,
rules, resources and decisions. Accountability
implies that an actor or group of actors must
justify their decisions and courses of action
before a legitimate authority or body.
Accountability involves control mechanisms by
which actions are kept within agreed and socially
approved boundaries.
Merrey (1996) notes that in centralized
bureaucratic irrigation systems, accountability is
typically oriented upwards toward superiors and
the political level. Accountability is not mutual. In
an institutional arrangement of interlocking, but
autonomous, management organizations, mutual
accountability between providers and end-users
of services needs to be designed within the
structure of authority established among the
stakeholders. According to Hofwegen (1996), this
involves service agreements or contracts, which
determine the rights and responsibilities of the
parties involved, as well as the procedures to be
followed in the case of nonfulfillment of
obligations. The same applies for accountability
within organizations, where representative bodies
of users of services monitor the performance of
their staff and elected office bearers.
Transparency. Transparency is of fundamental
importance for institutionalized accountability.
Stakeholders need free access to relevant
information, so that they can judge the
appropriateness and legitimacy of decisions and
actions.
“We say that an organization has
transparency if it is easy for any stakeholder
(that means any person who is affected by the
organization’s actions) to find out information
about its activities and performance” (Abernethy
1998, 85).
Therefore, transparency involves a “right to
know” about the relevant details of organizational
action, which thus requires meticulous record
keeping. In the water-resources sector, data on5
the flow and distribution of water, services and
money are of particular relevance.
Equity. The normative concept of equity is about
fairness in the distribution of irrigation water to all
users of a system. As such, it is subject to
debate among stakeholders about what is
considered fair. Local power relations often
infringe on equity and the resolution of conflicts
over inequity may define, for the time being,
what is considered equitable or fair enough
(Boelens 1998).
Equity concepts also depend on the
operational parameters and conditions of an
irrigation system. In supply-based systems
where fixed per hectare discharges based on
predetermined water allowances for agro-
climatic zones are provided, equity is defined by
the simple per hectare equality of water
deliveries. It is up to users to determine at what
cropping intensity they will use their fixed water
supply and under what kind of crop. Here,
equity means that all levels of an irrigation
system receive discharges proportionate to the
extent of their command areas. In demand-
based systems, equity may be defined as the
delivery of water quantities to each farmer
proportionate to standard crop water
requirements and the extent of land under such
crops. The equitable sharing of water scarcity
would imply reduction of supplies to each user
proportionate to the overall reduction of
availability. In demand-based systems this is
more complicated as water users, in principle,
should adjust their cropping patterns in light of
scarcity, and thus the overall pattern of demand
could change.
Equity, though not a fixed concept, is of the
greatest importance since it crucially affects the
operation of any system. Irrigation systems are
inherently susceptible to inequity due to their
physical structure, which makes the
disproportionate appropriation of water by head-
reach users at the expense of tail enders
possible at any level of the system, unless strong
institutional mechanisms and values define and
favor equity. Where head-tail inequities tend to
be chronic, conflict is frequent and adversely
affects system productivity and the effectiveness
of irrigation managers. However, where conflict is
present, inequity can be overcome through social
mobilization, negotiation and participatory
institution building.
The discourse on participation outlined above
provides relevant indicators for the study of the
status of irrigation systems carried out in the
situation analysis for irrigated agriculture in the
Kyrgyz Republic. Reference will be made to the
opportunities of stakeholders to participate in
institutional processes, to the status of
accountability and transparency of current
management processes, and to the degree of
equity in the distribution of irrigation water and its
effect on relations among stakeholders.
Research Methods
The research team carried out a rapid-appraisal
study involving stakeholder consultations with 98
respondents and observation of two irrigation
systems and their agricultural production units, as
well as drainage facilities, in two sample
provinces, Osh and Jalalabad, in southern
Kyrgystan. In addition, two WUAs, one with
separate governance and management and one
with merged functions, were selected in each of
the two sample irrigation systems.
Open-ended, structured questionnaires were
prepared for several types of organizations and
persons, from ministries to district WMOs, and
from private farmers and WUA representatives to
local government staff. These questionnaires
served as guides for in-depth discussions with
individuals and groups.
Irrigation operational and financial data, as
well as information on agricultural production
were collected from WMOs, farm units and other
sources. The intended methodology would permit
the study to establish a relationship between6
agricultural production (yields, prices, costs,
gross and net value of production
3) and the cost
of irrigation-system O&M (estimated, needed,
actual), as well as operational data on water
supply, in order to analyze the proportionate
share of O&M costs in the gross and net value
of farm production, the amount of the ISF
relative to the total O&M costs, as well as the
productivity of water at various irrigation-system
levels. However, some data availability and
access constraints reduced this intention to a
merely indicative exercise, which points at
probable issues and problems, but is hardly
sufficient or satisfactory from a scientific
perspective. The study team found that much
data are not available, that data from several
sources, but for the same irrigation system, are
inconsistent, and that in many cases the veracity
of the data provided appears questionable. Data
on both cost of vegetable production, an
increasingly significant cash crop and production
in family plots are not available. The year 2000
was selected for analysis, but as agro-economic
data for the Osh Province were not available, a
provincial-level agro-economic analysis had to be
omitted for Osh. The year 2000 is an instructive
year because, while prices for cotton had
remained good, water had become scarce, thus
enabling analysis of how the system is affected
by scarcity conditions without also being affected
by unusual price slumps.
It was impossible to analyze the relationship
between agricultural production, O&M costs and
water productivity at the hydro-system level
because of the nonavailability of agro-economic
and irrigation-system O&M data at the canal-
system level, and the lack of access to some
canal-operational data. However, data on the basis
of administrative units were assembled and
analyzed. This indicates a major constraint, which
is due to the lack of hydro-boundary management.
A range of relevant project and government
documents were studied as well. These are given
in the list of literature cited items.
The study team started with Provincial
WMOs (administrative units), as these are the
most available sources of information about
hydraulic units. Once suitable hydraulic units for
the study were identified, in particular IFCs and
main canals (MCs), several WMOs, farm units
and other stakeholders within the hydraulic units
were selected. In addition, a number of
representatives from the government, the donor,
and project agencies were interviewed.
3The gross value of product is derived by multiplying the received price by the total production; the net value of product is the difference
between the gross value of product and the total production cost.
The Post-Soviet Agrarian and Water Reforms in the Republic
During the 1990s, the transformation in Kyrgystan
was characterized by comparatively rapid and
radical changes in the agriculture sector, which
precipitated related reforms in the water-
management sector. The dismantling of the
Sovkhoz and Kolkhoz structure of property and
production relations and the consequent far-
reaching privatization of agricultural land left the
on-farm irrigation system without a responsible
WMO in charge of its O&M. The abolition of
economic planning and state-order production in
agriculture required that agricultural producers
develop entrepreneurial capacities and participate
in markets. The weakness of local markets and
recent price declines in cotton in the world market
have constrained farmers’ incomes and the state’s
ability for the taxation of land and production. As a
result, financial resources for irrigation system
O&M have become constrained as well, making
effective system management precarious.7
In reaction to these new conditions, the
water-resources sector is undergoing extensive
reforms, which are supported and influenced by
international donors. The reforms center on the
introduction of WUAs, responsible for on-farm
O&M and ISF, to gradually cover the
management of both the on-farm and the inter-
farm/main irrigation systems. This institutional
change is coupled with the rehabilitation of the
irrigation system for which the WUAs are a
vehicle for user participation, financially and
otherwise. The long-term perspective of the
reformist government is the expansion of WUA
responsibilities beyond the OFCs
4 to the IFC
system and the gradual withdrawal of the state
from management of the irrigation systems,
which is supported through the agricultural
development and infrastructural rehabilitation
projects funded by international development and
financial institutions, such as the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank.
This section will first outline the salient
features of the new landownership system. Then,
the structure and functions within the Republic’s
WMOs at various levels of the administrative and
irrigation system will be presented. Their capacity
to fulfill the core functions of irrigation
management will be assessed through the
analysis of the case study material.
Agrarian Reform
The legal basis for the privatization of land is the
“Land Code of the Kyrgyz Republic” and the
“Law on Farming,” both of 1999 (IWMI 2001).
The former establishes private property rights in
land and the latter makes general provisions for
the legal status of farms as independent
economic entities.
The privatization process is carried out
through the local government and the central
government’s Land Allocation Funds (LAF). The
government agents are appointed within a top-
down hierarchy. The President of the Republic
appoints the Provincial Governors who, in turn,
appoint district government agents who, in their
turn, appoint the government agents of the
village governments. The government agents,
their deputies and staff are in charge of the
general management of public affairs, including
agriculture and water. They supervise the local
branches of government departments under the
ministries and thereby establish a system of
“double-subordination” through which the
presidency achieves direct influence over local
affairs and ensures the implementation of top-
level policies on the ground. The local
government is a powerful institution, which
responds to requests and complaints from the
general population and is directly involved in both
land- and water-sector reforms.
Through the privatization process several
new forms of farms and property relations have
emerged. The peasant farm has been the
instrument for achieving full privatization of land
distributed among the rural population. Every
working-age member of the Former Sovkhoz
(FSK) is entitled to 0.13 hectare of irrigated
agricultural land to which he or she receives a
land title with full rights of sale, inheritance and
renting. In addition, a family can retain its home
and kitchen gardens, allocated during the Former
Soviet Union (FSU), as private property.
The second form of farm is the private or
farmer’s farm, which operates as an
entrepreneurial entity or company with bylaws
and a business plan, i.e., as a “legal entity.” Land
for private farms is leased from the state through
the local government, initially for 5 years and
thereafter extended for up to 50 years. The local
government assesses an applicant’s business
plan and bylaws, as well as financial and farming
capabilities before granting its approval. There is
4It is pertinent to note that although the acronym OFCs in the former Soviet Union means “on-farm canals” in almost all water/irrigation/
agriculture-related literature it means “other field crops.”8
no rental charge for these lands whose extent is
generally about 15 to 30 hectares but, in some
cases, it can be more than 100 hectares,
including nonirrigated land.
The LAF has retained about 25 percent of
the total land area of the FSKs under state
control. These lands are either leased out on a
short-term basis through auction or used for
public purposes, such as government buildings
and roads. Some respondents reported that in
their FSK the local government leased out the
undistributed land on a sharecrop basis and
prescribed cropping patterns, while in others the
lessees were free to cultivate whatever they liked
and paid a predetermined rent in cash or kind.
The process of land allocation appears to
generate inequity of land distribution. Influential
members of the FSKs, such as former directors,
agronomists and hydro-technicians, as well as
government officials in various government
departments and well-connected investors with
financial means, were reported to have
preferential access to larger and better-quality
land in the head reaches of the command areas
of irrigation systems.
The new agricultural production entities, if
they are established on irrigated land, are
individual water users who depend on the
provision of water-supply services. As traditional
recipients of services at the on-farm system
level, they are accustomed to communicating
demand and receiving supplies according to
actual availabilities. Yet, as the on-farm system
has lost its managers, they are expected to fill a
vacuum, which contributes to the deterioration of
a service on which they depend more than ever.
They are now independent farmers responsible
for a range of activities that, under the Soviet
system, had been carried out through a
specialized technical division of labor, situated
within a vast social division of labor, which took
care of anything from input provision to work
plans, and from the distribution of the agricultural
products to the provision of public services.
Water managers are also going through a
difficult and uncertain process of transformation
of their organizations, the definition of their roles
and the sources of their livelihood. Still at the
beginning of this process, they are struggling
with economic hardships and a deteriorating
infrastructure.
All of these actors are indispensable
contributors to a social-production process, which
has yet to generate the capacity and resources
to permit an adequate and effective flow of
goods and services and sustain livelihoods at a
satisfactory standard. The social capital of well-
institutionalized organizations and practices is a
crucial factor in the establishment of such a
production process. The Kyrgyz society has
embarked on a reform process that seeks to put
the key elements of such an institutional setting
in place. The evolving institutional structures in
the water sector are a central component of this
process of change.
Institutional Structures and Service
Relations
Water resources in Kyrgystan are the property of
the state, according to the Water Law of 1994
(IWMI 2001). A hierarchy of state WMOs at the
national, provincial and district levels carry out
water-management functions within their areas of
administrative jurisdiction. The WMO hierarchy
under the Ministry is under the direct authority of
the President and the Parliament (figure 1). The
village-level local government has been
established on the territories of the FSKs and
operates hydro-service departments with mirobs
5
(hydro-technicians). In recent years, WUAs have
5The local term mirob (irrigator) originates from the pre-Soviet irrigation systems, which were managed by the then much-respected mirobs.
Mirob in the local language means “water master”9
been formed by district governments and village
governments to involve the water users in OFC
management.
As the WMOs exchange water, finances and
information, and maintain relations of
superordination, subordination, cooperation,
competition and conflict, they form a network,
which carries out the core functions of water
management. The structure establishes a
hierarchy with unequal relations of power and
participation where farmers appear at the bottom
of the structure.
The top layer of the institutional hierarchy
primarily exercises regulatory and governance
functions in the water sector. The Parliament as
lawmaker debates and decides on the legal
FIGURE 1.










   








framework for the management of water
resources. The President, who is supported by
the advice of the National Committee on Water
Strategy, a think tank of scientists and
experienced water professionals, determines the
country’s water policy and is involved in the
process of law-making. So is the Ministry of
Agriculture and Water Management (MAWM)
whose leadership participates in the regulatory
and policy processes by making draft proposals
and providing information and expert
assessments. The government, through its
budget and the Ministry of Finance, provides
financial resources to the MAWM and its
subordinate WMOs. It directs and reviews their
performance.
The MAWM and the provincial and district
WMOs are the primary executive bodies
undertaking water management. They maintain
administrative relations with each other rather
than contractual ones. Each is upwardly
accountable within the hierarchy of organizations
through direct subordination to a supervising
officer. Supervisory, control, planning and
technical design functions increase toward the
top, while actual physical work in the canal
system and interactions with WUAs and water
users are concentrated at the district level.
The Minister of Agriculture and Water
Management participates in the interstate
meetings and the agreements on interstate water
allocations.
6 Where irrigation systems in
Kyrgystan receive water directly from the main
tributaries of the Syr Darya, the River Basin
Organization (RBO) distributes water resources
at canal headworks. The irrigation systems
studied were supplied from smaller tributaries
under the authority of the national WMOs where
the RBO is not involved.
In the Osh Province, contractual agreements
regulate relations between districts, sharing
responsibility for an interdistrict canal system.
The upstream district thereby guarantees the
supply of volumes of water according to an
agreed schedule to the downstream district. Both
are subordinated to the monitoring and control of
the Osh Province. In the Jalalabad Province, by
contrast, interdistrict canals were managed by
Interdistrict Canal Management Departments
under the province.
The districts and the WUAs or where the
latter do not yet exist, the village governments
interface through contractual relations. These
contracts determine the volumes of water
exchanged for ISF. WUAs have contracts with
individual water users, which again determine the
obligations of the parties to deliver water and pay
the ISF. Though physically dependent on the
services of the district, the WUAs are viewed as
formally independent organizations buying water
from the state. However, allocation remains in
the hands of the state WMOs while the WUAs
are registered by the Ministry of Justice. A
presidential decree has tentatively set the ISF as
a flat charge per unit of water used, which does
not vary by soil, climate, type of crop, etc.
Several secondary and tertiary canals do not
have measurement structures, and water levels
fluctuate considerably. Thus, the fee collection
process is at best based on guesstimates and
hunches.
Larger nonagricultural water users, such as
municipalities or industries, are provided with
services through contractual relations with the
MAWM, provinces and districts. They can either
obtain licenses to abstract water from streams
and other water bodies as primary users, or
enter into contracts with a primary user, such as
a province or district. Individual rural domestic
water users are not formally integrated with such
institutional mechanisms, and have not found
representation in WUAs as yet.
6 Due to centralized planning, there is a theoretical setup of collecting water demand from users, aggregating it to higher levels on the one
hand, and forecasting availability and then issuing “water limits,” or maximum permissible water use for each cropping season by states,
provinces and then by districts and farms.11
Operation. The main operational activities are
allocation through demand aggregation and water
distribution. The allocation process starts at the
farm level. Each farming unit communicates the
extent of its cultivated area and cropping pattern
to its WUA or the hydro-service department of its
village government administration. The WUA or
hydro-service department of WMO aggregates
the demand of all farm units within its area in a
seasonal water use plan, and submits it to the
district in charge of the district WMO. The district
again aggregates the entire demand within its
area and develops a district water use plan.
Water losses in the respective canal systems
calculated, based on standards developed in
1960s, are incorporated into the demand, which
is now moved upwards to the province at
provincial level, where the same process is
repeated. The province reconciles the demand
with the estimated water availability in water
sources such as reservoirs throughout the
season and instructs the district about the
proportionate distribution of water. These
instructions in some way act as maximum limits.
However, within the irrigation systems studied in
Kyrgystan, formal limits are either not recorded
or they are always recorded as identical with
demand. Only demand and actual supply differ,
as a result of the availability situation.
Actual supply and distribution result as much
from pragmatic considerations, such as the
immediate needs of crops in a certain reach of
the system or demands made by influential
stakeholders to provide special concessions, as
from the consideration of equity and
proportionality. Actual releases of water are made
by the districts’ hydro-sections and are regularly
recorded through measurement of discharges at
diversion structures. This information is then
again moved upwards in the hierarchy and
aggregated for monitoring purposes.
Maintenance. Maintenance activities are carried
out primarily by districts and interdistrict canal
management units at the MC and IFC level, as
well as by the WUAs and water users at the
OFC level. They assess costs on the basis of
annual maintenance-needs reports. Maintenance
capacities and actual activities are directly linked
to the amount of financial resources available to
a WMO. The willingness of water users to
participate in annual-maintenance campaigns in
the on-farm system and the ability of the WUA to
make labor contributions obligatory also affect
the functionality of the system and its
performance.
Resource mobilization. In the relations between
water users, WUAs/local government and
districts, the operational data mentioned above
form the basis of monitoring the fulfillment of
their terms of contract. The ISF is based on
volumetric charges, and payments for water
delivery are made according to the actual
amount of water delivered. The cash or in-kind
payments to the districts, in principle, cover 50
percent of their operating cost. The level of ISF
is decided by the Parliament. Charges for WUA
services are added to the water users’ bill, but
they vary from WUA to WUA, depending on
expenses and how total charges to individual
users are determined (volumetric- or area-based).
The remaining 50 percent of the O&M costs
of the district is covered from the government
budget. Again, a demand-aggregation process
takes place. A district estimates its salary, O&M
costs and registers its requirement for the
coming year with the province, which aggregates
all financial demands of the district and includes
its own budget needs and submits its financial
demand to the Ministry. The Ministry aggregates
all demands from the province along with its own
requirements and submits these to the Ministry
of Finance. Based on the availability of financial
resources and budget allocations from the
Ministry of Finance, actual financial allocations
are made to the provinces and districts flowing
down the hierarchies within the administrative
units involved. The availability of financial
resources is determined by the level of12
aggregate tax income and allocation decisions
within the government. Actual expenditures
among WMOs are recorded and monitored
upwards.
Conflict resolution. The institutional structure of
WMOs has not institutionalized formal
mechanisms of conflict resolution. Dispute
resolution and dealing with complaints remain
more or less informal. By necessity, conflict
resolution is directed toward the same persons
who are in charge of O&M of the system, which
follows its hierarchical order. Accordingly, farmers
can complain to their mirob, who may complain
to a WUA chief or canal-section head of the
district. If no resolution is achieved the complaint
moves upward and higher-level WMO officers get
involved. Local governments exercise a certain
regulatory power, as aggrieved water users can
seek their assistance in difficult disputes, which
then lead to consultations with the water
managers. The latter reported that these
channels of resolution normally work, while water
users’ responses were more mixed. Less-
influential small farmers from the tail reaches of
canals have little faith in their capacity to
mobilize means of redress, despite the existence
of WUAs.
Accountability and decision-making power. In this
system, accountability and decision-making
power are oriented upward, ultimately toward the
central government and the MAWM. Decisions
on the legal framework, financing and policy lie in
the hands of the Parliament, the President and
the Government and while stakeholders are
consulted to some degree, there is no formally
institutionalized process of participation in
discussions and decision making by lower-level
stakeholders. Demands are made upward and
actual resource allocations are decided top-down.
Lower-level water managers and users have no
representation in this process although they are
held accountable for actual service delivery and
expenditures. It is only at the WUA-district
interface that a direct relationship between
service delivery and payment for services is
emerging. However, levels of charges are not
related to the actual O&M costs.
The discussion has so far presented water-
resources management as a system of
relationships among WMOs and other key
stakeholders. These WMOs themselves are
organizational systems whose internal structures,
functions and staff are organized to enable them
to play their role within the wider institutional
framework.
Structures and Functions of WMOs
The structures and related functions presented
are typical ones, exemplifying the essential setup
in Kyrgystan. As far as they are relevant to the
discussion, variations in other organizations will
be pointed out.
The Department of Water Management under
the MAWM
The Ministry of Agriculture and Water
Management amalgamates three related spheres
of activity, i.e., agriculture, water management
and the processing industry. The key
departments of relevance for this study are the
Water Resources and Water Use Department,
which is responsible for allocation and
distribution; the Irrigation Systems Maintenance
Department, which controls the physical upkeep
of the system; the Economics, Finance and
Registration Department, which controls the
distribution of financial resources; and the Project
Management Department under which come
development projects like the World Bank WUA
Support Units and the On-Farm Irrigation
Management Project (OIMP). These structures
are sketched out in figure 2.13
Basin Water Management Department:
Oblvodkhoz
The key departments of the province mirror those
of the Water Management Department under the
MAWM (figure 3). The Water Use Department
under a senior engineer develops a schedule of
irrigation for the provincial irrigation system on
the basis of demand received from districts and
reconciles district water-use plans with estimated
availability. It controls and monitors water use.
The Construction  and Repairs Department
prepares a provincial plan of repair and
maintenance needs on the basis of assessments
by the hydro-sections of the districts. Costs are
estimated through the Accounts Department and
requests to the ministry are developed. These
and all other departments and sections are
accountable to a Chief.
The provincial-level interview respondents
characterized the functions of the organization as
mainly supervisory. The province controls the
activities of the districts in the province with
regard to water distribution, water-use plan and
the observance of allocation plans, maintenance
FIGURE 2.
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and repairs, and approval of activity plans. The
stated goal is to ensure equitable distribution of
the available resources. It collects data on all
management activities from the district and
aggregates the data on allocation, financial
requirements and expenditures for submission to
the Water Management Department.
The province maintains interprovincial
relationships with neighbors concerning the O&M
of shared canals. They solve problems and
manage cross-boundary issues, such as water
deliveries or repair needs, through negotiation
and joint decisions on the basis of their records.
Furthermore, the province implements the
rehabilitation plans of the Republican Department
and hires construction companies for large
projects.
District Water Management Department:
Raivodkhoz
The districts are the implementation departments
for all water-management functions in the general
canal systems in both provinces studied. Given
the relatively small size of the systems in Osh
and Jalalabad, they manage most MCs and
IFCs, with the exception of one main system
under an Interdistrict Department. Their internal
structure is again similar to that of the province
but their staff is larger since they include hydro-
sections responsible for a canal sector (figure 4).
Under the supervision of a Chief, the following
departments and functions are typical:
• The Water Use Department is led by a Head
Engineer (hydro-technical engineer)
responsible for the O&M of the irrigation
FIGURE 3.
Organogram of the Osh Province Basin Water Management Department.
   
   








system, in particular the allocation of water to
users and delivery to the OFC offtakes. Two
engineers are responsible for the supervision
of the hydro- sections’ implementation of the
department’s plans and one engineer is
specialized in land reclamation. The
Department also gets involved in the
regulation of conflict situations among both
water users and staff. Each hydro-section has
a Section Head and 6 to 12 technicians who
carry out O&M activities at the canal,
including minor cleaning and repairs. They
also control the level of discharges at the
OFC headworks, negotiate water releases
with farmers, and record and communicate to
the Communications Department the actual
discharges from IFC sections.
• The Repairs and Construction Department is
headed by a hydro-technician and assisted by
a construction engineer. They coordinate all
repairs and construction activities. Capital
repairs involving contractors require a tender
process carried out by the district’s Tender
Committee. Annual maintenance and repair
plans are developed and estimates submitted
to the provinces.
• The Communication Department headed by a
junior technician has four telephone operators
with radio telephones who collect operational
information three times a day and record the
data in a “book of supervision” or canal
register. This crucial function tracks the
development of the water-supply situation in
the district-canal system.
• The Mechanization Department is headed by
a senior mechanic who supervises an
assistant mechanic for repairs, a dispatcher
and five drivers. The Department runs five
tractors, five excavators and three trucks,
used for maintenance, repairs and transport.
• The Supplies Department consists of one
person handling and guarding the province’s
construction materials.
• A Senior Accountant heading the Department
of Accounts maintains all accounts, does
banking, and is responsible for salaries and
computerized records. He also heads the
personnel department, which looks after all
relevant personnel matters, including records
and hiring.
Water User Associations
WUAs have been a recent development in
Kyrgystan. Since 1996 there have been initiatives
by the village and district governments to
establish some level of responsibility for OFCs
among water users, because these are the most
deteriorated parts of the canal system and the
village government administration lacks the
financial and human resources to carry out the
necessary O&M tasks.
WUAs were initially established and formally
recognized under a 1995 government decree on
the “Regulations on WUAs in Rural Areas” and
eventually in the more comprehensive 1997
decree on the “Statute for WUAs in Rural Areas.”
The latter permits the transfer of OFC
infrastructure and the trade of water, requires
operational record keeping and ISF payments,
and enables WUAs to sanction the violation of
rules and regulations.
There were 42 WUAs in the Osh Province
and 44 in the Jalalabad Province when this study
was carried out. The WUAs collect an ISF from
their members and pay the district for the
delivery of water to their OFCs. They collect an
additional fee from their members to maintain
their staff and offices. The staff is in charge of
O&M activities, resource mobilization and conflict
resolution at the OFCs within their area of
authority. Maintenance activities are carried out
during the winter months, when canals are
mostly dry, and involve labor mobilization among
the farmers receiving supplies from the
respective canals. Since they were developed by
the FSK administration and the district, their
typical organizational setup closely resembles the16
structural model of the collective farm
administration and state WMOs and is dominated
by their chairman.
The procedure of selection of the WUA office
bearers is not uniform among the WUAs. Some
elect their council directly in general membership
meetings. In others, a WUA’s command area is
divided into sections and the cultivators in each
section select a section representative to the WUA
council. Here the council elects a chairman, either
from among the council members or from the
general members. In some cases, the chairman is
not a farmer in the command area, but hired as a
technical manager. Members of staff are hired and
salaried. There have been several projects
supporting WUAs under donors, such as the
World Bank and the ADB. The current projects
promoting WUA establishment and strengthening
are the World Bank’s On-Farm Irrigation Projects
(OIP) and the IWRM-Fergana Project.
FIGURE 4.
Organogram of the Karasu District Water Management Department.
Case Study of Two Irrigation Systems in Kyrgystan
This section looks at the constraints of effective
management of irrigation systems at their various
levels, in the context of the ongoing reforms, by
taking a case study approach. After the brief
introduction of the irrigation systems studied, the
discussion will be organized according to the
core functions of irrigation management taking
place in the reformed irrigation systems. It
concludes with a review of some key issues in
the implementation of water reforms and
development of WUAs in Kyrgystan to date.
Akbura River System
This system is located in the Osh Oblast of
Kyrgystan and is thus under the authority of the
Osh Province. It is below the Papan reservoir on
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the Akbura river, a former tributary of the Kara
Darya now terminating at the South Ferghana
Canal. Hence, several short MCs offtake from
both banks of the river south of the city of Osh.
These MCs form a small complex system in which
the water resources abstracted from the Akbura
river can be distributed to six IFCs or redirected to
the river to enable system managers to regulate
water-resources flexibly (figures 5).
The Yujni and Uvan IFCs offtake from the
RBMC and supply command areas of 4,824 and
588 hectares, respectively. The sample “Rakhmat”
WUA, serving an irrigated area of 3,509 hectares
on a section of the territory of the former
Kolkhoze “Kurmanjan Datka,” receives a part of its
water supply from the Yujni IFC in addition to the
Uvan and Osh Feeder IFCs. The WUA is located
in the head reach of the IFCs. Karasu District is
responsible for the operation of the right bank
main canal (RBMC) and the two IFCs serving the
Rakhmat WUA.
On the left bank of the Akbura, the Aravan-
Akbura MC offtakes and eventually splits into the
Aravan-Akbura IFC and an MC branch, which
serves two further IFCs and eventually flows back
to the river. The Aravan-Akbura IFC serves a
FIGURE 5.
Akbura river system.
     
 
 
     
           
         
         
      













command area of 8,153 hectares, of which 2,200
hectares are located in the Aravan District and the
balance in the Karasu District. The Aravan-Akbur
Sai WUA is responsible for the OFC system
serving the entire territory of the former Sovkhoze
“Kerma-To” and manages an on-farm irrigation
system with a command area of 2,078 hectares. It
receives its total water supply from the Aravan-
Akbura IFC and is located in its tail reach. The IFC
also serves as a feeder canal for the Aravan Sai, a
seasonal stream, which irrigates four agricultural
units (FSKs) in the Aravan District. The IFC adds
about 1–2 m
3/s to the Aravan Sai during most of
the cultivation season, but may carry up to 9 m
3/s
within the Aravan District, to provide the Aravan
Sai with 5–6 m
3/s during the season of peak water
demand and low to zero flow in the Aravan Sai.
The responsibility for the Aravan Akbura IFC is
shared by the Karasu and Aravan districts.
Karaungur River System
The Karaungur river system (figure 6) is located in
the Jalalabad Province, which manages the canal
system offtaking from the Karaungur river’s right
and left banks. The Karaungur is a tributary of the
Kara Darya. The RBMC serves a command area
of 18,000 hectares, supplies 104 IFCs and runs
through the Bazarkurgan and Nokeen districts.
The Massi IFC is fed by the RBMC and
commands an area of 2,424 hectares. The
sample Murat Murap WUA manages the on-farm
irrigation system offtaking from the Massi IFC.
The Vakhum Aral IFC also offtakes from the
RBMC and irrigates a command area of 2,240
hectares. It is the main source of the irrigated
area of the Aral village. Here the Aral Sai WUA
manages the on-farm irrigation system. Both
WUAs are located in the mid-reach of the RBMC.
The Aral Sai WUA covers the entire IFC, while the
Murat Murap WUA is in the head reach of the
Massi IFC. Nokeen and Bazakurgan districts are
responsible for the IFCs, while the RBMC,
together with the Left Branch Main Canal (LBMC)
and the Karaungur dam is under the Karaungur
Interdistrict Department. The LBMC was not
included among the sample sites selected.
Operation
Considerable losses due to rehabilitation and
maintenance deficits in the irrigation systems of
Central Asia interact with serious inequities in the
distribution of water to impair effective water
management.
The irrigation systems of Central Asia are
operated as demand-based systems. However,
under conditions of water scarcity, a demand-
based system can turn into an opaque supply-
based system.
There are indications that the demand-based
system in Kyrgystan is no longer truly operative.
The data in table 1 show that, in almost all
sample sites considered, demand cannot be
satisfied and actual supplies are consistently
below demand. Yet, limits no longer appear to be
imposed as an operational parameter. The data
recorded by the WMOs sampled in the Osh
Province only show demand and actual supply
while in the Jalalabad Province demand and limits
are consistently shown as identical. This situation
may be viewed as an indicator that Kyrgystan no
longer perceives the institution of limits as binding.
In fact, during the highly water-scarce summer
cultivation season of 2000, the Republic
consumed 124 percent of the allocated limits of
the River Basin Organziation (RBO) (ICWC 2001).
The consistent inability to satisfy demand
suggests scarcity conditions, which is borne out
by the general agreement among all water users
and managers in the Ferghana Valley that the
year 2000, the year of this study, was a “dry year”
in terms of water availability. The low inflow levels
into the Andijan reservoir in the Kara Darya
subbasin at 34 percent of averages, recorded by
the Syr Darya RBO, confirm this (ICWC 2001).19
FIGURE 6.
Karaungur river system.
The practice of assuming that demand and limits
can be equal proves to be dangerous, because,
as in 2000, scarcity will be a phenomenon that the
system is ill-prepared to deal with.
Under scarcity conditions, limits are intended
to modify demand across the entire system in
proportion to the deficit in water availability. This
would mean that scarcity is shared equitably.
However, if limits are no longer considered, this
equitable reduction of demand is no longer
operative. A water manager may respond to
actual availabilities and seek to distribute scarcity
equitably, or he may respond to pressures from
water users and their influential allies on a short-
term basis. The latter is especially likely because
farming in the region is habituated to a cropping-
plan-dominated system, supplied with seemingly
unlimited water resources. Therefore, cultivators
need to compete for water to meet crop demand.
Farmers are also used to making short-term
requests within a few days of intended field
irrigations. The prevailing system of irrigation
scheduling tends to follow a first-come-first-serve
principle at all levels, which entails inefficiencies.
Given scarcity, while crop demand is not adjusted
to availability, competition for the scarce water
resources intensifies and head-reach users may
appropriate water according to their demands
while tail-reach users will no longer receive even
three turns of irrigation for a crop requiring four or
five turns.
Scarcities are also temporarily concentrated
during the peak evaporative period of July and
August. During this critical period competition20
turns into conflict and water users are reported to
be stealing water, by manipulating gates at IFCs
and by taking water from OFCs out of turn, both
day and night.
Table 1 presents the data collected from the
records of the Osh and Jalalabad provinces,
Aravan, Karasu and Nooken districts and the
Rakhmat, Murat Murap and Aral Sai WUAs. It
indicates a remarkable difference in the
proportional reduction between demand and
actual supplies between higher-level units, the
province and the district, and the lower level
WUAs at the on-farm level, ranging between 32.5
and 50 percent.
It could be assumed that the WUAs are not
paying sufficient ISF thereby receiving reduced
actual supplies. Yet, this assumption is not
consistent with the pattern of the ISF collection
rate in the sample areas. According to
information received from the concerned WMOs,
the ISF collection rate for the Osh Province was
a mere 45 percent, while 85 percent of its
TABLE 1.
Operational data for sample areas (Kyrgystan, 2000).
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demand was received. The situation in Jalalabad
is slightly better at a collection rate of 65
percent, but is hardly reflected in its level of
demand satisfaction. In Nokeen Rayon, the
collection rate is 65 percent and the actual
supply is 107 percent. The lack of correlation
between actual supply and ISF rate is even
clearer in table 1.
The next possible reason for the WUAs’
gross reductions in supply relative to demand is
that the losses in the main and inter-farm
systems are extreme and can range from 26 to
50 percent. However, in the Aral Sai WUA,
losses exceed supply deficits, which could be
erroneously interpreted as limited inequity in
favor of Aral Sai.
However, if compensation for losses in the
WMOs’ water plans is considered at a
conventional rate of 5 percent for MCs and 20
percent for IFCs, i.e., a total of 25 percent, the
picture changes. Compared to the overall supply
rates in their districts, the Rakhmat WUA
receives 26.6 percent less than the average
water users within the Karasu District, and the
Murat Murap and Aral Sai WUAs receive 40 and
25.5 percent less, respectively, than the average
water users in the Nokeen District. Considering
there is a +/- 10 percent variation in proportional
distribution between canals within reasonable
margins of equity (Bhutta and Vander Velde
1993), these deficits indicate considerable
inequity in all three cases.
It is possible that water unaccounted for may
have been used in the sample sites because all
WUAs reported (see table 3 below) above-
average yields compared to their districts, while
their per hectare water supply, based on
recorded actual supply, would, in several cases,
be below normal crop demand.
At the sample sites, both users and
managers reported equity issues. Many farmers
reported that fights flare up when too many
farmers are queued up and wait their irrigation
turn and the mirob would favor certain farmers
over others. District officials at all sample sites
confirmed that head-tail inequity was prevalent at
the IFCs and OFCs since, in high-demand times,
upstream water users would steal water and
downstream farmers consequently do not receive
sufficient amounts.
In a water-scarce demand system, which has
turned into a nontransparent supply-based
system, such coping mechanisms of individual
cultivators are rational, as they cannot rely on
the system to be equitable and fair.
“There are problems with water distribution,
because our system does not have water
measurement devices,” Chairman and Director of
the Kermetoo Akbur Sai WUA.
WUAs need to be strengthened to fulfill this
role of management of common water resources
through cooperative action of free individual
producers, rather than through compulsory state
organizations. At present, there is a danger of
building another government organization besides
or within the village, which manages irrigation
systems by policing farmers and giving unfulfilled
promises.
The water managers appeared to be unclear
about their capacity for sanctioning irrigation
offenses. The means of sanctioning are the
reduction of supplies for individual canals or the
stoppage of water that can be unfair to innocent
parties. Therefore, more frequent and perhaps
more effective is the exertion of social pressure
involving the villages and districts. However, this
can be inefficient, if water managers spend too
much time resolving conflicts. Institutionalized
means and decentralization of negotiated
resolution through WUAs are therefore desirable.
“People steal water from each other.  They
(farmers) try to solve these problems on the
general meetings, but are never successful. We
do not fine people….” Chairman of the Rakhmat
WUA.
In a context of water scarcity and potential
inequity, measurement of water becomes all the
more crucial to ascertain proper distribution22
patterns and resolve disputes on the basis of
reliable data. However, despite the water
managers’ claim that they had sufficient devices,
measured twice daily, and that they maintained
and frequently calibrated their gauges, the
availability of functional measuring devices was
observed to be highly uneven. Measurement
structures in reasonable working condition were
generally present only at the MC and IFC levels.
Given that farmers pay volumetric charges, twice
daily measurements cannot accurately account for
fluctuations in the system. Flow measurements
with current meters to receive more accurate
sample readings were reported to be used for
special purposes, such as dispute resolution.
Guessing is involved at the OFC level in
most systems observed, and at most WUAs or
villages, the volumetric ISF rate is recalculated
on a per hectare basis for lack of measuring
capacity in the Kermetoo WUA and in many
others. Thus, rates can be considerably higher
than in systems using volumetric charges, a
condition, which may remain nontransparent to
the average water user.
Another condition affecting operational
capacity, much lamented by many water
managers, is the complexity of the irrigation
system, which has increased considerably with
the breaking up of collective farm units into
smaller private and peasant farms. This impaired
OFC management from a maintenance
perspective and responsibility has also created a
multitude of potentially competitive demands.
At present, there appears to be a need to
accommodate requests for water from a host of
users at the same time. The practice of first-
come-first-serve in listing turns between users on
an OFC appears wasteful and reduces
operational efficiency of a system. Water and
time are wasted as the turn is moved up and
down the canal. Recognizing this problem, some
WUAs have resorted to irrigating in sections,
which take subsequent turns, either in groups or
individually, depending on flow levels. Again this
requires discipline and means of sanctioning, and
the mobilization of WUAs is expected to resolve
these new difficulties.
“We use the canal water for laundry, cleaning
of houses, bathing, etc., as there is no domestic
water supply system in our village,” A farmer of
the Kermetoo WUA.
Irrigation plans and schedules have also
become more complicated since a greater variety
of crops having different water requirements are
grown. In addition, district staff complained about
receiving cropping plans too late from WUAs and
villages, which impairs timely planning at their
own level.
Another consequence of farm fragmentation
and privatization is that the new farmers are not
yet well experienced in water management,
farming and marketing and have to acquire
multiple skills. These include prompt and
accurate scheduling of irrigation turns and
preparing cropping plans, which then need to be
coordinated within OFC command areas.
The interconnected nature of the system
adds to complexity as well, where, as for
example in the Rakhmat WUA, the irrigated area
under the WUA is served from three IFCs plus
another branch IFC and where small canals the
size of field ditches offtake from IFCs as much
as from OFCs. The establishment of WUAs on
all or part of the FSK territory, instead of on
hydro-systems with clear hydro-boundaries,
makes operation complicated and inefficient,
since irrigation turns must always be coordinated
with other units. Such arrangements lead to
recurrent conflicts with upstream and
downstream units.
In Osh, at the IFC system level, interprovince
and interdistrict relations across shared canal
systems are organized rather informally. There is
no unified canal management, but more or less
informal communication across administrative
boundaries and, at the district level, a contractual23
agreement. The latter stipulates agreed amounts
of discharges and forms the basis for
negotiations in cases of conflict or the need to
reduce water supplies due to water scarcity.
Besides being inefficient from an operational
point of view, this leaves room for interpretation
of rights and each party would seek to first
represent and serve the interests of “his or her”
canal section and area of authority, especially if
there are additional pressures from “their”
farmers and Okims (local government officials).
They place two agencies with equal levels of
authority in a head-tail relationship. Negotiations
between two districts at provincial boundaries
can be particularly cumbersome since these may
be moved upwards to the provinces when four
agencies get involved in settling matters of one
canal. However, the Chief of the Osh Province
would only get involved in rare cases when
serious disagreements over downstream water
releases are developed.
In the Jalalabad Province, conflicts between
two districts sharing the Karaungur system, about
water theft by upstream users and alleged
complicity by upstream districts had been too
frequent to be handled effectively so that the
province resolved to create the Karaungur
Interdistrict Management Department. Its Chief is
authorized to give orders to the District Chiefs on
water operational matters. The province has
institutionalized a higher-level authority to control
conflicts from above, rather than creating internal
mechanisms, which would enable the districts to
effectively manage the hydro-system for which
they are responsible. At the same time,
administrative control replaces real integrated
hydro-boundary management.
Maintenance
Maintenance is highly uneven and follows an
informal system of prioritization, as the financial
resources for optimal care of the canals are not
available. First, urgent repairs of damages, which
would undermine the operation of the system are
attended to, such as the restoration of
headworks structures and major breaches in
canals. However, leakage due to cracks in lined
canals, reconstruction of canals, which no longer
conform to design parameters, and removal of
obstructions by gravel are deferred until they
develop into needs for urgent repairs. Often, this
means years of suboptimal operating conditions,
including high losses, obstruction of flow and
heading-up of level in the head reaches of
canals, all of which adversely affect downstream
water availability.
“We develop an O&M plan every year, but
we have difficulties in implementing it,” Chairman
and Director, Kermetoo Akbur Sai WUA.
At the on-farm level, WUAs and village
governments claim to carry out routine cleaning
of silt with the participation of farmers. Yet,
financial resources of WUAs are as yet
insufficient to enable them to hire the necessary
excavation equipment to undertake heavier
cleaning activities and to carry out much-needed
repairs of damaged canals.
The losses at the on-farm system create a
serious problem in accounting for the ISF
payment. As water is measured at the head of
an OFC, downstream users require larger
amounts during their turn, if losses of up to 50
percent occur. In such cases, the per hectare
charge, which is levied in WUAs without
measuring devices, appears fairer.
On the sample sites, seepage from fields is
collected in on-farm drains managed by WUAs and
returned to the many seasonal streams crossing
the irrigated areas. The drains were observed to be
in an unmaintained state, overgrown with weeds,
silted up and damaged and, in many places,
breaching. These cause waterlogging in adjacent
areas including agricultural fields, as the drainage
flow is obstructed.24
Resource Mobilization
The ability to mobilize sufficient resources to cover
the O&M costs, including the cost of ISF
collection, determines the financial sustainability of
a WMO and its irrigation system.
The cost of irrigation services can be paid
from two main sources, the direct fee payment by
service users or the payment through government
subsidies. In many countries, financial resources
from donor countries in the form of grants or
loans subsidize irrigation services to some extent.
Regardless of these sources of income, the
assumptions about cost recovery and ability to
TABLE 2.
Relationship between the O&M costs of irrigation systems, ISF and value of agricultural production in the sample areas
(Kyrgystan, 2000).
pay for required O&M, as opposed to mere
running of the system with deferred
maintenance, are crucial considerations for any
irrigation system and for investments in the
irrigation sector. To ascertain the financial
capacity of the irrigation system to pay for itself,
an analysis of the value of production of key
crops in the sample areas, as well as of the
O&M costs and recovery through ISF was
carried out (tables 2 and 3). In addition, we
attempted to estimate the value of water in the
sample areas (table 4). This analysis should be
considered as roughly indicative of the current
situation.25
Table 2.—Continued
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TABLE 3.
Gross and net value of production of major crops in the sample areas (Kyrgystan, 2000).
Table 2.—Continued27
Note: Data for year 2000 prices were provided by the Provincial Statistics Departments. All cost data for the Jalalabad and Osh provinces at
all levels were taken from the Report of the A-2 Component of the GEF Project on “Participation in Water Saving” (GEF & DHV 2000)
Table 3.—Continued
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Note: The formulae applied to calculate average values and cost are as follows:
Average gross value = Ó (y*p*FCCA)i1-x / Ó FCCA i1-x
Average cost = Ó(c*FCCA)i1-x / Ó FCCA i1-x
Average net value = Ó(n* FCCA)i1-x / Ó FCCA i1-x
where, y = yield, p = price, c = cost, FCCA = proportion of irrigated area for crop type, n = net value (y*p-c), and i1-x = different crop types.
Table 3. —Continued
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TABLE 4.
Value of water in sample areas (Kyrgystan, 2000).
With the introduction of ISF in 1999, the
state began a process of reducing its financial
responsibilities for irrigation management. Now
the state has assumed responsibility for the cost
of the MAWM and the provinces and for 50
percent of the O&M costs of the districts. The
remaining 50 percent and the entire cost for OFC
systems are to be borne by water users through
ISF. The present rate for ISF is not determined
by the actual cost of the respective systems, but
by an across-the-board volumetric fee of KZS
0.03/m
3 of water supplied to OFCs. The on-farm
O&M costs are determined by the WUAs or
respective villages, and thus in WUAs, at least in
theory, by the water users.
Table 2, column F shows that the
approximate rate of ISF collection varies greatly
within the sample areas. Columns G and H show
the amount of ISF paid per hectare and adjusted
according to the ISF collection rate for each unit
of analysis and based on actual water supplied in
2000 (table 4, column E). Table 2, column G
shows the fee collected for the WUA or district
separately and column H shows the combined
ISF rate for the on-farm (WUA) and inter-farm
levels. Where the WUA members pay a
volumetric charge, the WUA’s own per hectare
income is very low compared to the WUA which
charges a high per hectare rate.
Table 2, column A shows the actual O&M
expenditure per hectare for 2000 reported by the
WMOs sampled and column I indicates the
recovery rate of actual expenditures by ISF
collected. The relatively high recovery rates for
the WUAs with available data, despite less than
full collection rates, are explained by their very
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low level of actual expenditure for maintenance
(lack of funds) and, in the case of Murat Murap,
by the higher ISF rate. The two districts actually
recover more than 50 percent of their actual
costs with ISF payments. This picture changes
considerably if the estimated cost or requested/
planned budget of the WMOs is considered
(columns B and K). The Karasu District can still
cover more than 50 percent of its estimated cost,
while the Aravan District can cover 49 percent of
its estimated cost. All WUAs fall short of their
anticipated O&M costs by 78 to 63 percent.
The estimated O&M costs are not a very
good indicator of actual O&M needs. WMO staff
stated that they always requested budgets very
much below (almost half of) their real needs for
repairs and maintenance, because they knew
that actual requirements would never be covered.
The WUAs also do not budget real needs
because they also know that their ISF share
would never cover such expenditures.
To get a somewhat more realistic idea of
actual O&M needs and the capacity for cost
recovery, the estimated O&M costs of the WMOs
were doubled (column C). This assumption is
based on the perceptions of the higher-level
WMO staff that they intentionally reduce O&M
needs by half, because they know by experience
what will be funded. At the doubled rate of
estimated O&M costs, the present ISF can only
cover about a quarter of assumed expenditures
at the district level and only between 11 and 19
percent of WUA costs (column L). The somewhat
higher recovery rate of the Aral Sai WUA is due
to its higher per hectare ISF.
The data presented so far clearly show that
only districts cover about or more than the
expected 50 percent of both their actual and
estimated O&M costs from the ISF. Among the
WUAs, actual costs cannot be met at present
collection rates and present levels of ISF.
It is often argued that volumetric charges are
a useful means to force water suppliers to fulfill
their contractual obligations and thus promote
accountability and equity. However, this market
mechanism does not work when general
availability is uncertain and losses are high.
Nevertheless, the situation discussed is once
more aggravated by the fact that the Kyrgyz
economy is extremely cash-poor, as a
consequence of the government’s fiscal policy.
As a response, an extensive barter economy has
emerged in Kyrgystan, which entails a
considerable, yet hard-to-estimate, volume of
economic transactions. This has significant
adverse consequences for resource mobilization
by WMOs and their ability to provide an effective
service.
WUAs depend entirely, and the districts in
part, on IFS paid by water users whose ability to
pay in cash is highly constrained due to the
circumstances described. Therefore, the
government permitted water users to pay a part
of the IFS in kind. The water managers
interviewed at all sample WMOs reported that
the cash/kind ratio was anywhere between 50/50
and 20/80 against the prescribed 70/30.
“Last year (2000), we collected 70% of the
ISF, 30% in cash and 70% in natural products
(in-kind). I do not get anything for maintenance,
as the ISF is only enough to pay salaries, which
we pay in natural products,” Chairman of
Kermetoo Akbur Sai WUA.
For the districts, the situation is slightly less
adverse than for WUAs. Since the districts
receive about 50 percent of their budget from the
government coffers, they have some access to
cash. However, the districts reported that at
times they receive cloths or machine parts. In
order to procure necessary consumables, such
as fuel for vehicles or construction materials, the
water managers have to sell the goods received
or barter them for the needed goods.
The barter economy and in-kind payment of
ISF have decreased the efficiency and
effectiveness of water management. Members of
staff waste time with marketing goods, and
procurement of necessary O&M inputs has
become more expensive as a result of receiving
low prices for their goods. Altogether, the ISF31
and budget remittances are mainly spent on
salaries and consumables, while capital repairs
are neglected entirely, unless foreign exchange
funds from donors can be secured.
This situation notwithstanding, the ISF
payments in cash or kind are all accounted for in
money terms by the WMOs and, therefore, it is
possible to analyze the relationship of ISF to O&M
costs, as well as to agricultural production. To
understand how present O&M costs and ISF
affect farmers’ income and whether higher ISF
charges would be reasonable, the gross and net
value of production was calculated on the basis of
available data on agricultural yields, prices and
production costs. In these calculations the key
crops cotton, wheat and rice (for others, data
were not available) were considered first and then
average gross and net values derived based on
their proportional share in the total cropped area.
Table 3 shows general consistency in the
gross and net values of production between the
various units of analysis with variations owed to
differences in agricultural yields.
A comparison of the actual O&M
expenditures and the gross value of production
(GVP) in table 1, column M, suggests that to
cover the present WUA O&M costs only 0.1
percent of the GVP would be required, while at
the district level 0.7 to 1 percent would be
needed.
Columns D and E indicate the O&M gap
between actual cost and estimated cost (O&M
gap1) as well as doubled estimated cost (O&M
gap2). The relationship between O&M gap1 and
net value of production (NVP) and O&M gap2
and NVP is explored in columns P and Q,
respectively.
To get a sense of the total cost incurred by a
WUA member at present ISF rates, the
proportion of total ISF (WUA + district) of the
GVP is presented in column R of table 2.
Next, in columns S and T the necessary total
ISF required to cover simple estimated costs is
calculated as a per cubic meter and per hectare
rate.
Finally, table 4 presents an analysis of the
value of water. The data show that the gross




well with data from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
and Iran, which range between US$0.04/m
3 and
US$0.15/m
3 (Molden et al. 2001; Perry 2001).
However, if the losses incurred at the various
irrigation system levels are figured in for the
Rakhmat and Murat Murap WUAs, the value of
water declines by more than half. Thus, there is
all the more incentive to invest in the
improvement of the system in order to reduce
losses.
On the basis of this analysis it may be
concluded that, while the current ISF cannot
cover the present O&M costs of the WUA and
district levels, it amounts only to a very small
fraction of the gross value of production (GVP) in
the sample sites. If the IFS is raised to a realistic
level of O&M cost recovery, the increase needs
to be considerable, yet it would amount only to
around 3 percent of the GVP. This level of IFS
can be considered a reasonable investment in
one of the most crucial means of production and
may, therefore, provide a feasible target for long-
term rate increases, particularly considering the
extensive need for system rehabilitation.
Yet, the optimistic data, gleaned from the
analysis of production costs, yields and prices,
need to be put into perspective. Agricultural
markets in Kyrgystan are insufficiently developed
and many farmers are unable to sell enough of
their products to achieve a reasonable standard
of living. The decline of farm-gate prices of
cotton in 2001, from about KZS18/kg in 2000 to
KZS6/kg
7 has caused considerable losses, as the
profitable year of 2000 motivated all the farmers
to increase the area under cotton. This change in
market conditions shows the vulnerability of the
Kyrgyz market situation. Farmers lack
7US$1.00 = 40 KZS.32
appropriate information sources about market
trends and do not fully understand the effects of
oversupplying the market with a single crop. They
are not sufficiently familiar with crop diversification
and are reluctant to invest in new crops, as they
do not see any, and may well lack, opportunities
for their marketing. There is a gross lack of
information services about anything from
agricultural techniques to marketing and
processing.
Considering that marketing is a key problem,
farmers were asked about their willingness to
form marketing and input-purchasing
cooperatives. They failed to see any value in
such efforts as these ideas reminded them of the
Soviet period. the Kyrgyz society still fails to
value the importance of civil-society institutions,
which underpin individual freedom with
functioning community services, based on shared
responsibility for common goods and interests.
Market constraints are among the key
obstacles of sustainable institutional change in
water-resources management in Kyrgystan. The
farmers’ inability to earn sufficient cash and pay
higher ISF in cash, despite a reasonable
production, seriously jeopardizes the
sustainability of the O&M of irrigation systems.
Conflict Resolution
The provinces and districts do not maintain a
formal structure for dealing with complaints and
there is no culture of institutionalized debate and
negotiation among stakeholder groups. A case
that cannot be resolved through informal
negotiation will be moved along the hierarchies of
the double-subordination structure of government
administration and eventually top-down solutions
will be directed.
The local governments constitute one of the
chief mechanisms for dealing with complaints,
which may be concerned with problems between
farmers and the government WMOs, and also
between farmers. While farmers were reported to
directly communicate with the districts through
their hydro-sections in the first instance, they
approach their village head, if disputes are not
resolved satisfactorily at this level. The water
managers recognize the local government as an
arbitrator, whose authority may bring persistent
conflicts to an end, but they also find that the
Okim can reach solutions and impose demands,
which interfere with the allocation and distribution
system they have established. In Kyrgystan, the
Okims have no formal administrative authority
over WMOs, but their political and moral
authority is strong and in the case of WUAs, the
role of the village head in resolving problems is
undisputed.
It was only at the Rakhmat and Murat Murap
WUAs that a formal conflict-resolution
mechanism was institutionalized in the form of
arbitration committees. Recognized and
entrenched conflict-resolution mechanisms are a
signal that arbitration is taken seriously and
offenses are not tolerated, and they help relieve
the burden of water managers in spending time
in resolving disputes. They also provide
transparency and avoid conflicts of interest, as
they keep executive staff out of formal
arbitration.
The conflict-resolution mechanisms are thus
a mix of informality and top-down imposition of
resolutions. Stakeholders, including farmers, are
used to complaining and appealing to authorities.
A WUA is not necessarily recognized among
farmers as a means of getting their disputes
resolved. Formal and recognized mechanisms for
joint resolution, based on mediation and
negotiation among stakeholders, are a new
concept in a culture in which civil-society initiative
and responsibility are weak.
“People steal water from each other. They try
to solve these in general meetings, but are not
successful,” Chairman of Rakhmat WUA.33
Organizational Management
All WMOs including WUAs reported that they
were appropriately staffed, with the exception of
the hydro-sections, which require additional staff
during the peak irrigation season, in order to
patrol canals during nights to prevent water theft.
Members of the technical staff have the requisite
levels of educational qualification. The
organizations’ departments are well established
and structured according to functional
requirements. Roles and tasks are clearly
assigned and divided in a technical division of
labor. The interface of departments within
districts was reported to work usually without
problems and, financial means permitting, key
tasks are accomplished. However, members of
the staff interviewed were, at times, unable to
report on the roles and functions of other
departments except those of their own.
The layers of state WMOs and their
departments keep extensive records of all their
transactions, from water to finance, by which
service is accounted for internally and
performance is monitored. Staff evaluation and
sanctioning of rule violations are in the hands of
chiefs and department heads. The record-
keeping activity was meticulous in some WUAs
and incomprehensive in others.
Members of staff are frustrated by their low
level of pay, which ranges from as little as
KZS400 (or US$10) for a dispatcher to about
KZS1,299 (US$30) for a WMO chief, and by the
unreliable and untimely receipt of payments,
most of which are received in kind. Such a
situation can make water managers susceptible
to rent seeking and toleration of rule violation.
Internal accountability is organized upward
within a conventional hierarchy of subordination
and superordination, and lower-level
administrative units are subordinated within a
structure of increasing centralization.
Accountability to the users of services is not
institutionalized and is an alien concept to local
water managers.
The formal organizational structures of a
WMO are not based on a team approach but on
a system where orders are handed down and
members of lower staff report upwards. Yet,
especially in the districts, where daily problems
are solved and staff work in the field, a good
deal of debate and discussion for joint problem-
solving was observed. The dysfunctional demand
system appears, in practice, to have been
abandoned and is replaced by an approach
which juggles available supplies with the needs
communicated at the field level.
The system as a whole practices an outdated
command-oriented management model and
organizational culture, which is not based on
critical internal debate and joint exploration of
problems. From the WUA to the province all
members of staff are focused on the chiefs and
their decisions, as well as on procedures. Such
systems tend toward ritualism and formal task
fulfillment, but are less-effective in searching for,
and finding, optimal solutions for problems and in
motivating staff dedication.
Formal opportunities for stakeholder
participation are nonexistent. There are no
management or review boards or similar
institutional mechanisms through which
representatives of farmers, the local government
and others could participate in the governance of
irrigation and water-resources management. In
fact, governance and execution of irrigation
management at the local level are not separated
but both are concentrated in the hands of WMO
chiefs who, in turn, are governed by the ministry
and central government. Only the local
government exercises a certain amount of
governance and regulatory power over the
WMOs, which are however insufficiently
formalized and transparent, as open participatory
structures are missing.
Some members of WMO staff are, generally,
supportive of irrigation rehabilitation or
modernization projects, as these promise
financial resources for system rehabilitation or
additional income opportunities for participation in34
project activities. But they are worried that
reorganization of water management along
hydro-boundaries may endanger the job security
of other members of staff and of themselves;
they are also worried about the integrity of the
irrigation system if IFCs are to be transferred to
WUA Federations. Both of these concerns
betrayed a lack of knowledge about the process
of WUA formation and the meaning of hydro-
boundary management and how it may be
organized through new types of WMOs. This is
not surprising because the present approach to
WUA development has been formalistic and has
done little to enhance the capacity of WUAs to
improve their irrigation system. The discussion on
hydro-boundary management has been restricted
to policymakers and technical specialists. WUAs
and, especially, hydro-boundary management are
at this point not entirely demand-driven
propositions and their implications are not widely
understood as yet.
WUA Mobilization
The purpose of WUA establishment since the
mid-1990s has been to compensate for the
disappearance of state and collective farms as
water managers in the old on-farm system.
Although village governments initially hired
mirobs to fill the gap, they and the districts
eventually wanted to turn over responsibilities to
WUAs. Meanwhile, the WUA concept was
promoted through donor and government
initiatives. Thus, villages and districts started to
establish WUAs in their areas of authority without
demand from the new farmers. This has had two
important consequences.
Separation of powers
The organizational structure and distribution of
powers resemble those of WMOs and collective
farms. The functions of general assemblies and
meetings are minimal and the organization is
centered on its chairman. The functions of
governance and execution are vested in the
chairman, who is a member of the council and
simultaneously the director of the staff. The WUA
acts as a service organization under the local
government and not as a civil-society association
embedded in the community (figure 7).
The consultants (Johnson III, 1999) realized
this problem and developed the OIMP WUA
Support program and they proposed an
alternative model with clear separation of the
functions of governance by General Assembly,
Council and Chairman, who employ and govern
their salaried staff including its Director (figure 8).
The governance structure is intended to be the
community’s mechanism for ownership and
control, while the executive structure is its
instrument for irrigation services.
Mobilization process
The OIMP’s mobilization approach is not
sufficiently oriented toward the development of a
WUA from within the community it serves. The
present process of mobilization and training is
focused on establishing formal structures and
developing competencies in assuming roles and
fulfilling tasks among office bearers and staff,
and eventually it gears toward undertaking
rehabilitation measures. The widespread order-
and-control mode of institutional and
organizational management prevents genuine
participation of water users in the governance of
the WUAs as much as in higher-level WMOs.
“The chief of ailokomat (local government),
raivodkhoz chief (district WMO) and some
farmers participated in the discussions on the
WUA charter...I am not satisfied about the
mobilization process, as chairman, accountant
and 6 mirobs are employed…I do not know how
many are the WUA members…I am
inexperienced and do not know what to do…The
farmers' task is to get water and pay for it until
the end of the year….The farmers have no
status (other right)….There are a lot of problems35
FIGURE 7.
Organogram of the Aral Sai WUA.
FIGURE 8.














with farmers, because they don’t pay and are
illiterate…,” Chairman and Director, Kermetoo-
Akbur Sai WUA.
Farmers’ empowerment, accountability of
water managers to water users and transparency
of decision-making and management processes
do not appear to be on the WUA agenda. The
concern about lack of community ownership of
the WUAs is borne out by the field data. The
water users expressed a clear sense of
alienation from the WUAs responsible for their
irrigated areas. The WUAs were perceived as
someone else’s organizations, either of the
chairman or of the village.
The farmers interviewed thought of them as
other government agencies trying to manage
their OFCs, which favored their personal friends
while demanding money for their services. They
complained about having to pay ISF without any
guarantee that the amount of water stipulated in
the contract between the WUA and the water
users is actually delivered.
If the WUAs are to be capable of
implementing equity in the distribution of water
and of motivating farmers to maintain their canals
and pay ISF, the associations will need to be
based on the participation and commitment of
the water users they serve. The water users
need to build the organization and the new
management practices among themselves with
the help of well-prepared social mobilizers, who
understand that for a WUA to be embedded in
the community of water users, the mobilization
process needs to start at the grass roots and not
with a chairman/director promoted by districts
and local-government agents.
A participatory mobilization process first
explores the water users’ key problems and
needs. The social mobilizers need to build an
understanding of, and rapport with, the
community through participatory appraisal. Based
on a shared understanding of the issues at
stake, an organization with a leadership by
competent and trusted members can be
developed, which discusses the WUA’s structure,
tasks and functions and adopts its bylaws. The
mobilization process will have to clarify the
definition of, and values implied in, equity,
accountability, transparency and empowerment.
Once office bearers are elected to the board of a
WUA, i.e., a governance structure has been built,
management staff including a technical director
can be hired and business and irrigation plans
developed. Capacity-building measures need to
provide WUA members, office bearers and staff
with the requisite skills for their roles throughout
this process and, especially, while the community
and WUA professional staff undertake the
required PIM tasks. According to the WMO staff,
formal ownership of the canal system will only be
transferred once the WUA members and staff
have demonstrated their commitment and
capacity for effective management.
There are several positive examples around
the world, like those in parts of India, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Turkey and Pakistan, to mention a few,
where deployment of specialized social
mobilization teams has led to greater ownership
and sustainability of WUAs, despite a hostile
policy environment (see for instance, Ul Hassan
et al. 2003) .
If farmers truly come to own their association
and irrigation system in this fashion, they may
have developed a sense of trust in the reliability
and equity of the services they are paying for,
and may no longer feel impelled to compete
against each other for the most precious and
scarce resource in their production system.
Future Vision
Their vision for the future was discussed with
water managers at the provincial and district
levels. They expect that the state’s commitment
to reorganize the irrigation system within the
coming 10 years will lead to the gradual
disappearance of the present government WMOs
and to the increasing privatization of the system.
One proposal entails the formation of joint stock37
companies, which would own the IFCs from
which WUAs can buy shares.
The proposed arrangements bear some
dangers. If privatization at the higher system
levels should proceed without building
participatory structures in which the OFCs are
represented, a joint stock company may function
no differently from the present districts.
Ownership is a public good, such that water
must not depend on the capacity to buy shares,
but on an entitlement deriving from
stakeholdership—in this case, the need to
receive an equitable share of water to ensure
economic production and livelihoods.
Instead, WUAs on one IFC system should
federate by sending representatives to a Water
User Federation (WUF) Board, which will then
govern the IFC management organization in the
same manner as at the WUA/OFC level. Thereby
the interests of all sections of the IFC, from tail
to head, can be represented and social
ownership of the system by its users achieved.
The key principle is always that, in order to
generate cooperation and compliance with the
rules governing the irrigation system and the
WMOs, all water users must be able to trust that
services are delivered equitably and their
livelihoods ensured. For farmers to understand
and trust such propositions a thorough and
grass-roots-based mobilization approach is
needed.
It must be understood clearly that even if
districts should disappear in the long run, the
professions of irrigation engineers, hydro-
technicians and the auxiliary staff will remain
indispensable. The new arrangements will place
them under a new participatory-governance
framework, which makes them accountable to
water users. For irrigation engineers to be able to
function productively within a participatory
framework they also need to undergo a
socialization process in which they can overcome
their apprehensions about the new management
arrangements and power relations. A culture of
partnership needs to be fostered and nurtured
with practical experiences.
Conclusions
The agrarian reform in Kyrgystan has been rapid
and comprehensive, and most agricultural land
has been privatized or leased to private land
users. The markets are, however, weakly
developed, and constraints on the availability of
money have led to the operation of a vast barter
system, which involves both the private and the
government sectors. The restructuring has not
only caused an increasing inequity of land
distribution but created an institutional vacuum
for the secondary canal-level water-distribution
system (formerly on-farm irrigation system). The
capacity of water users to jointly operate and
maintain their irrigation system with WUAs,
especially at the secondary canal level, is only
slowly emerging.
The management of water resources for
agricultural and nonagricultural uses, except for
drinking water, is under the authority of an
extensive system of governmental WMOs,
structured along administrative territorial
boundaries of states, provinces, districts and
local management units. These administrative
entities crosscut and fragment river and canal
systems at all levels. In response to problems
arising from fragmentation, interdistrict WMOs
have been set up by higher-level provincial
WMOs in some areas. However, these remain
fundamentally committed to the administrative-
territorial principle, since the main task of these
WMOs is to act as a link between provincial and
district WMOs by distributing MC water to
districts and by maintaining the MC system
through district hydro-sections. They fail however
to achieve hydro-boundary management of
unified canal systems. The consequence of this38
complex, but fragmented, setup is competition
for, and conflict over, relatively scarce water
resources. This occurs particularly during the
peak demand period not only between water
users but also between water management units
operating within the same hydro-system.
Though the local government system has
direct control over water-resources management
only at the village level, the relationship at
higher levels was characterized by water
managers as one of consultation and influence,
which may cause inequity and interfere with the
canal’s operational regime. Analyses of data
and reports of water managers and users
indicate that, in Kyrgystan, competition for
relatively scarce water resources, particularly
during the peak demand period, leads to
widespread inequity between the head and tail
reaches at all levels of the irrigation system,
from the river basin through the MCs, IFCs and
OFCs. The tail-end farmers interviewed at the
Murat Murap WUA considered this as a major
problem. Data on annual water supply and
demand suggest that moderate inequity also
exists at the higher system levels, with deficits
relative to demand ranging between 5 and 20
percent. At the on-farm level WUAs reported
deficits of up to 50 percent, or up to 30 percent
if losses are considered.
The majority of respondents reported that the
head sections of OFCs and IFCs sought and
generally succeeded in appropriating water
resources beyond their entitlements, by using
various means, such as placing obstructions
across canals to increase discharges to their
OFCs and opening or raising gates at canal
heads. Within district sections and even at the
provincial level, cultivators and farm units also
negotiate for additional supplies or irrigation
releases out of turn with considerable success.
All such interventions disorganize the operational
regime. Tail enders suffer losses of water and
income.
Water managers stated that they often feel
powerless. They attempt to solve disputes ad
hoc and by informal means, but frequently resort
to the punishment of offenders through fines and
water stoppages. Conflict resolution is normally
informal and frequently involves the imposition of
top-down resolutions by higher authorities. Within
WMOs, formal, participatory and transparent
conflict resolution, involving local stakeholders,
appears to be absent. Institutionalized debate
and negotiations are missing. Formal arbitration
committees had been established only at two
WUAs studied in Kyrgystan. The obsolescence of
the present allocation system, based on demand
aggregation and limit setting, is among the chief
causes of competition for water resources. A
demand-based system becomes dysfunctional
under conditions of water scarcity and turns into
a nontransparent supply system. In Kyrgystan,
where adherence to limits has become
questionable at the interstate level, limits no
longer function as an operational parameter at
lower levels in the sample sites studied and
demand cannot generally be satisfied. As the
head reaches take more water, inequity ensues
and scarcity intensifies downstream throughout
the irrigation systems.
The emergence of an increasing number of
agricultural units due largely to privatized lands in
Kyrgystan complicates water management, as it
tends to multiply the quantity of individual
demands thus making the design, timing and
observance of water-distribution plans difficult. In
Kyrgystan, WUAs have been established to
provide the many water users at the OFC level
with a management organization. However, it is
questionable whether these WUAs command
sufficient authority among the water users, to
successfully deal with equity problems.
Furthermore, most have been established on the
territory of former collective and state farms,
rather than on the basis of hydrological
boundaries. If they manage fragments of several
OFCs or even IFCs, they inevitably compete with
neighboring WUAs or villages, since these new
WMOs lack appropriate institutional means of
unified canal operation and conflict management.39
Due to financial constraints, maintenance and
rehabilitation of canal systems are suboptimal
causing considerable losses of water resources
to the respective systems and their various
levels. Only the most urgent repairs, such as of
headworks structures and canal breaches, are
carried out, while repair of, for example,
damaged canal lining and joints is generally
deferred for years. The resulting combined losses
at the main and IFC levels of the sample
systems were reported to be between 26 and 45
percent and OFC losses are estimated to be up
to 50 percent. The lack of functional measuring
devices at the OFC level makes an accurate
assessment of losses, as well as reliable and
equitable distribution of water supplies, difficult.
The IFCs and MCs are generally outfitted with
measuring devices. The state of both disrepair
and inadequate maintenance causes suboptimal
operating conditions, which contribute to inequity
and the undersupply of tail reaches of the canal
systems.
Considering the immense rehabilitation needs
of irrigation and drainage systems in the country,
financial resources required far exceed the
capacities of the water users and the
governments of the Central Asian Republics. At
present, in Kyrgystan, the frequently delayed and
partially in-kind payment of ISF and budget
allocations impose significant constraints on the
ability of water managers to discharge their tasks
efficiently, in addition to their financial hardships.
The budget requests for O&M of systems are
chronically underestimated and resource
mobilization is inadequate. The rate of ISF
collection varies greatly, and the present ISF
charges fail to cover the actual O&M costs of
WUAs, particularly if they apply volumetric rates
and are affected by inequity. At a more realistic
doubled rate of estimated O&M requirements
(relative to real system needs), the WUAs and
districts would run deficits of more than 75
percent. The present ISF charges in Kyrgystan
are too low. To achieve a reasonable coverage of
O&M needs at combined OFC and IFC levels,
the ISF would need to be raised 5 to 7 times its
present value. But this would still only require 3.1
percent of the GVP. While this indicates a
feasible investment in water-resources
management, well within levels for comparable
irrigation systems in Asia and Europe, at present,
the dominance of the barter system and the
weakness and inefficiency of markets in
Kyrgystan prevent cultivators from realizing the
value of their production in monetary terms.
Therefore, their capacity to cover the O&M costs
at the OFC and IFC levels are constrained.
Effective organizational management is
constrained by an outdated command-oriented
management model and organizational culture.
Chiefs dominate upwardly accountable staff,
organized in strict organizational and
departmental hierarchies. Insufficient team
orientation and the tendency toward
administrative formality, typical for such a
management style, prevent critical internal
debate and open exploration of problems and
solutions. Consequently, the organizations’
capacity for innovation, problem-solving and staff
motivation are constrained. Formal opportunities
for stakeholder participation, especially of water
users, in the governance process and debates
within the WMOs are absent. Governance and
executive functions are vested with the same
leading officers of WMOs. Thus, the quality of
management and service delivery depends very
much on the personality and level of initiative of
these organizational leaders. The need for formal
structures and an institutional culture that
facilitates high-performing management
organizations have not been widely perceived
among stakeholders as yet.
Generally, the approach to WUA development
tends to remain within the entrenched model of
government services and does not sufficiently
embed the WUAs in the communities they serve.
WUA mobilization is mainly carried out by the staff
of WMOs and local government agencies. A40
coherent and well-designed participatory approach
to social mobilization, which targets and involves
both water users and managers and builds their
capacity for carrying out the core functions of
water-resources management is nonexistent.
Participatory structures and values are
underrepresented and there is a danger that the
WUAs will become a mere mechanism for the
transfer of system-rehabilitation funding and labor
mobilization to water users. The difficult tasks of
improving system operation and resolving conflicts
over inequity require more sustainable and
committed organizations mobilized at the grass-
roots level. The need for professionalization of
social mobilization in the water-resources sector
and the development of organizations capable of
providing mobilization services have not yet been
recognized. A comprehensive legal framework is
under development in the Kyrgyz Republic. This
requires further debate, refinement and eventual
approval by the authorities. The granting of
institutional powers to WUAs has only been
observed in Kyrgyzstan since the inception of the
On-Farm Irrigation Project. But it has not yet been
formalized. Institutional mechanisms for conflict
resolution and the establishment of WUAs on the
basis of hydrological boundaries are not yet
considered in the proposed legal framework.
The study found that, at present, a shared
understanding of key concepts in integrated and
participatory water-resources management, as
well as of a commonly accepted terminology,
which reflects the recent changes in irrigation
systems and facilitates the design of reformed
institutions, has yet to emerge.
It was also observed that the availability of
operational, socioeconomic and financial data is
constrained. Transparent data-sharing among water
professionals has not been institutionalized as yet.
Data for hydrological, rather than administrative,
units of analysis are not collected or not available.
Therefore, a transparent, comprehensive and
reliable Management Information System (MIS)
needs to be developed. The purpose of the MIS
should be to enable the water-management
institutions at all levels to monitor, evaluate and
improve the performance of the water systems,
and for informed decision making by their
representative structures.
The above discussion reveals that a barter
exchange system has emerged due to
underdeveloped markets, which seriously
constrains the capacity of the WMOs and WUAs
to finance all the core functions. This barter-
exchange tendency needs to be curtailed
immediately through rationalized fiscal and
monetary policies. The water resources at all
levels (small river systems, main, secondary and
tertiary canals) are currently managed along
territorial boundaries of provinces, districts and
Soviet-time farms, leading to inequity in water
distribution and potential for conflict. These
organizations need to be reorganized, at all
levels, along hydrological boundaries following
IWRM principles, where governance and
management are clearly separated and
stakeholders’ interests are strategically brought in
through the governance representative structures,
which should also be made formally responsible
for dispute resolution at their own level, and for
unresolved disputes from the lower levels. The
democratic governance structures at all levels
need to be introduced, through professional
social mobilization rather than through an existing
top-down and bureaucratic governmental
apparatus. The key elements of mobilization
should be awareness-creation, consultation,
information-sharing and capacity-building of the
stakeholders and their governance structures at
all levels. Such an approach would lead to
greater ownership of the WUAs and WMOs by
the stakeholders, and to ensuring willingness to
pay for O&M.
It is also evident that under the growing
water-scarcity conditions, an increasing number
of poor and small farmers, increasing crop
diversification and incompatible water-delivery
infrastructure and lack of water-measurement
devices to measure water for each farmer, a
demand-based water management might not be41
relevant to the current needs and, therefore, a
proportionate supply-based system might need to
be adopted, like those in some South Asian
countries. Under such a system, it will be
adequate if main and secondary canals, and the
head structures of tertiary canals are provided
with water-measurement devices, which to a
large extent do exist, and the water is delivered
to the users in proportion to the available
supplies, which can be negotiated and agreed
between the stakeholders and the water
managers through their representative structures.
The ISF structures and levels need to be
rationalized. The low levels and inappropriate
structures of the ISF, coupled with the poor
capacity of the farmers to pay, and weak markets,
necessitate exploring the potential of
unconventional means to finance the O&M and
rehabilitation needs of the irrigation and drainage
infrastructure. Such unconventional means could
include, for example, growing and selling fruit and
other fast-growing timber on the canal banks,
selling the nutrient-rich silt for earth-filling or
improving farm fertility, or selling out fishing rights.
The current and forthcoming rehabilitation
efforts through development projects, which
partially subsidize rehabilitation, should be
implemented in a way that encourages
investments by the stakeholders in the
infrastructure, rather than creating a dependency
on external sources. Such an approach will lead
to greater ownership of infrastructure and
management organizations by the local
stakeholders.43
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